Recent stories of corporate insiders avoiding losses and, in some cases, generating enormous personal profits as their companies crumbled have led investors to question the integrity of American business and the fairness of the United States stock markets. The SEC tries to ensure the fairness of the stock markets by making and enforcing laws against unfair practices such as insider trading. In the United States, when insiders trade stock based on non-public information, they have broken the law and betrayed the (...) trust that has been placed in them.This study used student subjects to test the relationship between the likelihood of trading based on insider information and subjective probabilities of deterrents and motivations for insider trading. Expected gain, guilt, cynicism, and fairness of laws were the determinants that had a significant relationship with the intent to trade based on insider information. This study also found support for prospect theory with regard to insider trading. The results indicate that subjects are more likely to trade based on insider information to avoid a loss than to achieve an abnormal gain. The study also finds evidence of social desirability response bias. (shrink)

The recent accounting scandals have raised concerns regarding the closeness of auditor–client relationships. Critics argue that as the relationship lengthens a bond develops and auditors’ professional skepticism may be replaced with trust. However, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 states that auditors “should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and (...) integrity” (AICPA 2002, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, paragraph 13, p. 10). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether auditors develop trust in a client’s management and whether this trust affects auditors’ decisions. Specifically, this study examines whether auditors’ satisfaction with a client’s management during a prior audit engagement affects auditors’ self-reported trust in that client’s management and whether that trust affects their fraud risk assessment. The decision to trust a client’s management should be an ethical decision because excessive trust may impair auditors’ skepticism, which auditors are required to maintain by their professional responsibilities. We therefore also investigate whether auditors’ trust is affected by their moral reasoning. An experimental case was completed by 89 professional auditors, all with experience assessing the risk of fraud. The results suggest auditors’ satisfaction with the client affects their trust in the client (higher satisfaction associated with higher trust and lower satisfaction associated with lower trust). Further, after an overall unsatisfying experience, auditors’ trust affects their fraud risk assessments. However, after an overall satisfying experience, their trust does not affect their fraud risk assessments. The results indicate auditors are able to maintain their professional skepticism after satisfying past experiences with the client regardless of their beliefs about the honesty and trustworthiness of the client’s management. Lastly, auditors’ moral reasoning was not related to their trust in the client’s management. (shrink)

The recent accounting scandals have raised concerns regarding the closeness of auditor–client relationships. Critics argue that as the relationship lengthens a bond develops and auditors' professional skepticism may be replaced with trust. However, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 states that auditors "should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor's belief about management's honesty and (...) integrity" (AICPA 2002, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, paragraph 13, p. 10). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether auditors develop trust in a client's management and whether this trust affects auditors' decisions. Specifically, this study examines whether auditors' satisfaction with a client's management during a prior audit engagement affects auditors' self-reported trust in that client's management and whether that trust affects their fraud risk assessment. The decision to trust a client's management should be an ethical decision because excessive trust may impair auditors' skepticism, which auditors are required to maintain by their professional responsibilities. We therefore also investigate whether auditors' trust is affected by their moral reasoning. An experimental case was completed by 89 professional auditors, all with experience assessing the risk of fraud. The results suggest auditors' satisfaction with the client affects their trust in the client (higher satisfaction associated with higher trust and lower satisfaction associated with lower trust). Further, after an overall unsatisfying experience, auditors' trust affects their fraud risk assessments. However, after an overall satisfying experience, their trust does not affect their fraud risk assessments. The results indicate auditors are able to maintain their professional skepticism after satisfying past experiences with the client regardless of their beliefs about the honesty and trustworthiness of the client's management. Lastly, auditors' moral reasoning was not related to their trust in the client's management. (shrink)

Many professions, in order to enforce their ethics codes, rely on a complaint-based system, whereby persons who observe or discover ethics violations may file a complaint with an authoritative body. The authors assume that this type of system may encourage ethical behavior when practitioners believe that a punishment is likely to result from a failure to adhere to the rules. This perceived likelihood of punishment has three components: detection risk, reporting risk, and sanction risk. A survey of potential violation witnesses (...) related to the accounting profession revealed that the profession's complaint-based enforcement system may not provide practitioners with the necessary disincentive to refrain from code violations. (shrink)